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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME X APRIL, 1936 NUMBER 2
THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF SURROGATES'
COURTS IN NEW YORK
A property, passing by death in New York, whether it be
through a Will, or as a result of intestacy, must, of
necessity, come under the jurisdiction of the Surrogates'
Courts of that state, for such courts are given by statute the
commission "to administer justice in all matters relating to
the affairs of decedents, and ** to try and determine all
questions, legal or equitable *** necessary to be determined
in order to make a full, equitable and complete disposition of
the matter by such order or decree as justice requires." I
And the legislature further grants among the incidental
powers of the surrogate, the power "to proceed, in all matters
subject to the cognizance of his Court, according to the course
and practice of a court having, by the common law, jurisdic-
tion of such matters, except as otherwise prescribed by stat-
ute; and to exercise such incidental powers as are necessary
to carry into effect the powers expressly conferred." I
These courts which operate so efficiently under the afore-
said comprehensive grants of power are scarcely to be recog-
nized as courts which have grown out of the Dutch Colonial
Judicial Council, the English Prerogative Court, the Mayor's
Court and the early Court of Chancery.
Yet, the roots of the present power of the Surrogates'
Courts extend back to these early tribunals and to under-
stand the present scope and limits of their jurisdiction, par-
ticularly in equity, it is necessary to keep in mind their origin
and the history of their development from a merely adminis-
'SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 40.
2 SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 20, subd. 11.
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trative tribunal into their present form as courts of record
and of original jurisdiction.3
In the revised statutes of 1830, we find the now almost
incomprehensible provision "that no Surrogate shall under
pretext of incidental power or constructive authority, exer-
cise any jurisdiction whatever not expressly given by some
statute of this State." Such a law, as might well be sup-
posed, proved so unworkable that it was repealed by Chapter
460 of the Laws of 1837. For as Chancellor Walworth re-
marked, in Pew v. Hastings: '
" * * * the exercise of certain incidental powers
by courts was absolutely essential to the due adminis-
tration of justice and * * * the legislature had not, by
their care and foresight, been able to take the case of
these Surrogates' Courts out of the operation of the
general rule."
Following the repeal in 1837 of this restrictive statute,
the legislature, by numerous enactments, extended the juris-
diction of Surrogates' Courts.
Nevertheless, as late as 1911, the Court of Appeals speci-
fically stated that these courts possessed no jurisdiction, ex-
cept such as had been especially conferred upon them by
statute, together with such incidental powers as were requi-
site to enable them to effectually exercise the jurisdiction
actually granted.5
Thus, in three-quarters of a century, these courts despite
their constantly growing importance, had been unable to get
very far from the basic idea of colonial times that their juris-
diction was to a large extent purely ministerial and that they
possessed only such powers as were expressly granted to
them or which were absolutely essential and incidental
thereto.
For early history and later development of Surrogates' Courts, see In re
Brick's Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 12 (N. Y. 1862) ; Matter of Runk, 200 N. Y. 447,
94 N. E. 363 (1910).
' 1 Barb. Ch. 452 (N. Y. 1846).
'Matter of Runk, 200 N. Y. 447, 94 N. E. 363 (1910); see also In re
Bolton, 159 N. Y. 129, 53 N. E. 756 (1899) ; In re Bunting, 98 App. Div. 122,
90 N. Y. Supp. 786 (lst Dept. 1904), appeal disnissed, 182 N. Y. 552; N. Y.
CONST. (1777) art. XXIV; N. Y. CONST. (1821) art. V, § 6; N. Y. CONST.
(1846) art. VI, § 14; AMENDED JUDICIARY ARTICLE (1869) art. VI, § 15;
N. Y. CONST. (1894) art. VI, § 15.
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While it must still be recognized that these courts have
not yet become courts of general equity jurisdiction, never-
theless by reason of the learning, experience and diligent
work of great surrogates, past and present, not only in doing
the work submitted to them, but in pointing the way in
court, and out of court, before bar associations, in legisla-
tive halls and in the professional and lay press, we have
today in New York, Surrogates' Courts which are univer-
sally acclaimed for the speedy and satisfactory adminis-
tration of the important matters over which they have
jurisdiction.6
But the present desirable condition and the universal
wish of the surrogates and the bar for even greater perfec-
tion has been won and is maintained only at the cost of
constant watchfulness and intelligent co-operation from the
legislature, the higher courts, the surrogates themselves and
the bar of their courts.
Too frequently other courts, either grudgingly concede,
or actually deny to Surrogates' Courts the equitable powers
which they possess,7 fearful lest these other courts lose their
equitable powers in matters which, while once almost exclu-
sively handled by them, can now be settled, as the public
has learned to understand, to far better advantage, and with
more expedition in Surrogates' Courts.
Nevertheless, the surrogates thus criticized and restrict-
ed have neither usurped power nor denied the admitted
chancery jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They have
'REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW
YORK STATE (1934). "Because there have been no complaints, but on the con-
trary, universal praise of the efficiency of the Surrogates' Courts, and because
of the splendid work of the Commission which recently revised and harmonized
the entire law relating to the work of the Surrogates' Courts there has been
no need for any study of these courts by this Commission."
'Witness the following remarks of Mr. Justice Carew of the New York
Supreme Court, in the much publicized case of the Matter of Vanderbilt,
wherein he said: "* * * This order was made in order that the Supreme Court,
the highest court of original jurisdiction in the State of New York, the
successor of the Kings High Courts of Law and High Court of Chancery,
endowed by the Constitution of the State of New York with all the powers of
all those courts, might be able to enforce its own decrees. I will not tolerate
for one instant the suggestion that the Supreme Court should go, hat in hand,
to the Surrogate of New York County and ask him to cut off the relator's
revenues if she kidnaps this child and removes it to Europe. I regard as an
impertinence the consideration and discussion by the Surrogate in his opinion
in 158 Misc. 889 of any decree that I may make of this matter."
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merely pointed out that matters of which they themselves
have jurisdiction can be better handled in their own courts
than in the Supreme Court, even though the latter court has
still full chancery jurisdiction.8
Mr. Surrogate Foley, in his decision in the Vanderbilt
case, merely followed the policy of all present-day surro-
gates by interpreting literally those provisions of Section 40
of the Surrogate's Court Act which require the court to
administer justice and to try and determine all questions
legal or equitable, necessary to be determined in order to
make a full, equitable and complete disposition of the matter.
The day is happily past since the Appellate Division
was forced to hold, as it did in 1903 in deciding the case of
U. S. Trust Company of New York2 that the surrogate had
no power to pass upon the validity of a questioned general
release.
A little over a year later the same court specifically
stated: 10
"It has been settled by repeated adjudication that
the general equitable powers of a court of equity have
not been conferred upon Surrogates' Courts and, there-
fore, no authority exists in it to exercise such
power." 11
Such general equitable powers have not yet been con-
ferred upon the Surrogates' Courts but despite some opinion
to the contrary, there is nothing to prevent such a grant to
them were the legislature to consider it necessary. Such a
grant of general equitable jurisdiction would not be uncon-
'Matter of Vanderbilt, 158 Misc. 889 (1935).
'80 App. Div. 77, 80 N. Y. Supp. 475 (1st Dept. 1903).
" In re Bunting, 98 App. Div. 122, 90 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1st Dept. 1904).
"Matter of Howley, 104 N. Y. 250, 10 N. E. 352 (1887) ; Van Sinoren v.
Lawrence, 50 Hun 272, 3 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1888) ; Matter of Wagner, 52 Hun
23, 4 N. Y. Supp. 761 (Sup. Ct. 1889), aff'd, 119 N. Y. 24, 23 N. E. 172
(1890) ; Matter of Hodgman, 11 App. Div. 344, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (3d Dept.
1896); Matter of Randall, 152 N. Y. 508, 46 N. E. 945 (1897); Matter of
Horn, 7 App. Div. 89, 39 N. Y. Supp. 954 (1st Dept. 1896); Matter of Schnable,
136 App. Div. 522, 121 N. Y. Supp. 54 (1st Dept. 1910); Matter of Clyne, 72
Misc. 593, 131 N: Y. Supp. 1090 (1911); Matter of Widmayer, 28 Misc. 362,
59 N. Y. Supp. 980 (1897).
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stitutional for Judge Earl, writing for the Court of Appeals
in Matter of McPherson,12 said:
"It is also objected that the act confers powers
upon Surrogates' Courts not authorized by and con-
trary to the Constitution. There is nothing in the
Constitution which in any way specifies or defines the
powers or duties of Surrogates. They are recognized
in various sections of the Constitution and they have
been known by the laws of the State since the founda-
tion of our government. Their jurisdiction has, from
time to time, been defined in the statutes and from
time to time extended and enlarged. Surrogates'
Courts have always had jurisdiction of the adminis-
tration, adjustment and settlement of the estates of
deceased persons * * * "
The Surrogates' Courts have, however, always had such
incidental powers in the application of equitable principles
as were necessary for them to do justice in such matters as
were before them, if jurisdiction of the subject matter of
such proceedings had been expressly given to them by
statute.1
3
In the Matter of Brown,14 Mr. Surrogate Slater pointed
out the distinction between the case where the court must
determine the assets of an estate under statutory equitable
power and that where it had to determine title to real estate
presently owned by innocent third parties, under the exer-
cise of general equitable jurisdiction, chancery in character.
He stressed the fact that while the Surrogate's Court had
only such power as the statute gave it to determine in an
accounting proceeding, the title or the right of possession
of property which belonged to the deceased in his lifetime,
that, nevertheless, it could also determine the conflicting
claims of the decedent's estate and the executor, individu-
ally, and could make any decree necessary or proper to pro-
-104 N. Y. 306, 324, 10 N. E. 685 (1887).
" Vreedenburgh v. Calf, 9 Paige 128 (N. Y. 1838); Isham v. Gibbons, 1
Bradf. 69 (N. Y. 1849); Dobke v. McClaran, 41 Barb. 491 (N. Y. 1864);
Matter of U. S. Trust Co. of N. Y., 175 N. Y. 304, 308, 67 N. E. 614 (1903);
In re Brown, 192 Misc. 293, 221 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1927).
" 129 Misc. 293, 221 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1927).
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tect the rights of both parties. In other words, in a case
where the fiduciary made individual claims against the es-
tate, the court had all of the power necessary to determine
the justice of such claim and to make an appropriate decree.
Such a determination would fall far short of the exercise
of general equitable jurisdiction and would amount merely
to the exercise of the inherent equitable power of the court
to render complete justice in a matter of which it had statu-
tory jurisdiction, namely, to compel the fiduciary to fully
perform his duty.
The learned Surrogate of Westchester County thus
clearly gives effect to the true meaning of subdivision 11 of
Section 20, Surrogate's Court Act, for since the repeal of
the unfortunate law of 1837, adverted to above, there has
been no real question but that the surrogates have always
had those incidental equitable powers which as Chancellor
Walworth said, 15 were necessary for any court, if it was to
do the work assigned to it.
Much of the seeming conflict in the decisions applicable
to the court's equitable powers will disappear, if we keep in
mind this distinction of Mr. Surrogate Slater. To have gen-
eral equitable jurisdiction to determine any equitable ques-
tion is quite different from the power to solve, by the appli-
cation of equitable principles, matters within the clear scope
of the court's statutory jurisdiction.
As the work of these Surrogates' Courts increased and
the importance of the matters entrusted to them seemed to
require it, the legislature in 1914,16 attempted to codify the
existing law applicable to such courts and enacted Section
2510 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, as amplified, is
the present statute,17 which gives the court its basic equitable
jurisdiction.
While the statute thus enacted in 1914 seemed and was
intended to be, a grant of plenary power, it was not so con-
strued by the appellate courts for there came down from the
Appellate Division, Second Department, a case which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and which, for seven years,
seemed to block the march of the Surrogates' Courts towards
" Supra note 4.
'8 N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 443.
' SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 40.
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real equitable jurisdiction. It was the Matter of Holz-
worth 18 wherein Mr. Justice Carr, writing for a unanimous
court, said:
"It is claimed, however, by the Respondents; that
by Section 2510 of the present Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,, the Surrogate's Court has been given full
equity jurisdiction in every proceeding that comes be-
fore it and that the Surrogate of Westchester County,
in the case now before us, had the power to exercise
this full equity jurisdiction on the facts that came
before him. It is, of course, true that in Section 2510
of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature has de-
clared as follows:
"'Each surrogate must hold, within his county, a
court, which has, in addition to the powers conferred
upon it, or upon the surrogate, by special provision of
law, jurisdiction, as follows: To administer justice in
all matters relating to the affairs of decedents, and
upon the return of any process to try and determine
all questions, legal or equitable, arising between any
or all of the parties to any proceeding, or between
any party and any other person having any claim or
interest therein who voluntarily appears in such pro-
ceeding, or is brought in by supplemental citation, as
to any and all matters necessary to be determined in
order to make a full, equitable and complete disposi-
tion of the matter by such order or decree as justice
requires.'
"But this legislative declaration is followed im-
mediately by language as follows:
"'And in the cases and in the manner prescribed
by statute: * * * 3. To direct and control the conduct,
and settle the accounts of executors, administrators
and testamentary trustees; to remove testamentary
trustees, and to appoint a successor in place of a tes-
tamentary trustee. 4. To enforce the payment of
debts and legacies; the distribution of the estates of
166 App. Div. 150. 151 N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dept. 1915), aff'd, 215 N. Y.
700, 109 N. E. 1079 (1915).
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decedents; and the payment or delivery by executors,
administrators, and testamentary trustees, of money
or other property in their possession belonging to the
estate or fund.'
"As I understand the law of statutory construc-
tion, all general phrases in a statute must yield to a
particular specification contained in some statute. As
to the subdivisions of Section 2510, just quoted, the
cases and the manner in which the surrogate may ex-
ercise his equitable jurisdiction are specified particu-
larly. Where there is such a specification, it must
exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with the specifi-
cation. Its general equitable power must yield to the
statutory restrictions upon it, or directions as to it,
and where the statute prescribes when and how it shall
act, it cannot act otherwise than is prescribed. I think
this is so well settled even as to courts of general
equitable jurisdiction, as to require no discussion."
This decision which so clearly limited the equitable
power of the court to those matters enumerated, in the sev-
eral subdivisions of Section 2510 '9 which followed the gen-
eral preamble of said section, once more emphasized the
limited scope of the court's jurisdiction.
Cases such as the Holzworth decision clearly decide that
the Surrogate's Court is a court of limited equitable juris-
diction, and must ever remain so, until the legislature strikes
off the shackles which restrict its equitable powers to those
cases where it already has express jurisdiction of the subject
matter or of the person.2
" Now existing in amended form as SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 40.
'Other examples of decisions sustaining this limitation and holding that
the court has no general equitable power to review situations or contracts,
jurisdiction of which is not specifically given to the court by statute, may be
found in the following cases: Matter of Heinze, 179 App. Div. 453, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 1017 (3d Dept. 1917); Hughes v. Cuming, 165 N. Y. 91, 58 N. E. 794
(1900) ; Matter of Martin, 211 N. Y. 328, 105 N. E. 1079 (1915) ; Roderigas
v. East River Savings Institution, 76 N. Y. 316 (1879) ; Botlon v. Schriever,
135 N. Y. 65, 31 N. E. 1001 (1892) ; Matter of Walker, 136 N. Y. 20, 32 N. E.
633 (1893) ; Matter of Underhill, 117 N. Y. 471, 22 N. E. 940 (1889) ; Matter
of Thompson, 41 Misc. 223, 83 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1903) ; Matter of Watson. 215
N. Y. 209, 109 N. E. 86 (1915) ; Matter of Schnabel, 202 N. Y. 134, 95 N. E.
698 (1911) ; Matter of Kenny, 92 Misc. 330, 156 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1915) ; see
also General Note of Revisers of Surrogates Code Chapter 443, Laws of 1914.
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In other words, while the court in those matters ex-
pressly committed to it, may reach out and, by using and
applying equitable principles, may do complete justice be-
tween the parties before it, nevertheless, the parties must be
properly before it and must be litigating a matter clearly
within the court's statutory jurisdiction. Collateral matters
or parties improperly impleaded are wholly outside its juris-
diction.
Yet, in recent years, there has been an ever increasing
tendency to clarify and extend this court's equitable powers,
not by granting it general equity jurisdiction, but by en-
larging the scope of the matters expressly assigned to it.
Many of these matters of their very nature require the ex-
ercise of equity jurisdiction.
Such a rule is necessary particularly in accounting pro-
ceedings where the court is most frequently called upon to
apply equitable doctrines and remedies. It is also sometimes
necessary, and the surrogates have exercised it, with the ap-
proval of the higher courts of the state, in probate proceed-
ings, in discovery proceedings, and in proceedings involving
the rights of trustees and persons beneficially interested in
testamentary trusts.
For instance, the present Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals said in speaking of agreements not to contest a will:
"As we have above stated, such agreements are
only cognizable in equity; they are enforced by a de-
cree which enjoins or prevents a contracting party
from proceeding contrary to the agreement. Equity
molds the relief to fit the situation, to compel the party
to keep his bargain. As the Surrogate's Court, under
section 40 of the Surrogate's Court Act, now has
equity jurisdiction, the surrogate, after hearing the
parties and taking the proof, will determine as would
a court of equity whether these next of kin have any
legal or equitable standing in his court." 21
An interesting example of the application of the exercise
of the court's equitable power arose in a case where a legatee
'in re Cook's Will, 244 N. Y. 63, 71, 154 N. E. 823 (1926).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
had made an assignment of his legacy and the assignee came
into court on the faith of the assignment, claiming to be en-
titled to the legatee's share of the estate. The legatee on his
part asked the surrogate to set aside the assignment on the
ground of fraud, and the assignee objected to the court's right
to pass upon the question. The court did pass upon it and its
action was approved by the Appellate Division, which said:
"How can the surrogate determine the petitioner's
standing in court, his right to file objections, the
proper recipient of the interest which was the peti-
tioner's before the assignment was executed, or direct
the distribution of the estate, until it is determined
whether the assignment is valid (in which case the
petitioner has no standing in court and the executors
have acquired his interest), or invalid (in which case
the petitioner has lost nothing thereby)? The very
purpose of the grant of power and jurisdiction to the
surrogates, both in 1910 and 1914, was to enable them,
in the eight classes of proceedings enumerated in sec-
tion 2510, to try and decide every issue, whether legal
or equitable, which was necessary to be decided in or-
der to make a final decree or order. Thus a proceeding
of the kind indicated, once begun in the Surrogate's
Court would proceed to a final order or decree there-
in, without being halted; and final decision postponed,
in order that a suitable action might be brought in the
Supreme Court to dispose of some question directly
affecting the subject-matter then pending before the
surrogate.
"The assignment in question necessarily and
vitally affects the disposition to be made of the execu-
tors' accounts and the distribution to be made of the
decedent's estate. No decree or order could be made
settling the account or directing a distribution until
the validity of the assignment had been determined.
My conclusion therefore, is that the surrogate had
power and jurisdiction to make the order appealed
from.
"The decision in Matter of Mondshain, 186 App.
Div. 528, 174 N. Y. Supp. 599, is not at variance with
[ VOL. 10
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the views herein expressed. The proceeding there was
one for a discovery, and alleged the transfer of money
by decedent to the respondent therein, and his refusal
to disclose the same, the execution and delivery of a
general release, and that it was induced by fraud.
Such a proceeding is not one of the eight enumerated
classes to which the general grant of jurisdiction con-
ferred by 8ection 2510 attaQhes, and therefore the
power to set aside a release did not exist in such a
case. But here the proceeding is one enumerated in
the section, and therefore full jurisdiction attached to
enable the surrogate to decide any issue required to
be settled in order to make an effectual final decree." 22
Finally in Raymond v. Davis' Estate23 we find in the
lucid and authoritative language of Chief Judge Cardozo,
what is perhaps the best statement of the true extent of the
present equity jurisdiction of Surrogates' Courts. This case
decided in May, 1928, fourteen years after the general amend-
ments made in 1914 affecting the court's jurisdiction and
seven years after their clarification by the amendment of
1921, which was passed by the legislature to overcome the
effect of decisions similar to that in the Matter of Holz-
Worth 24 and which amendment inserted in Section 40, Sur-
rogate's Court Act, the provision that the powers granted
should thereafter be deemed to be in addition to and with-
out limitation or restriction on the general powers granted
in the preamble of the said section, summed up the law to
date and in unmistakable language pointed the road along
which those interested in the speedy and efficient adminis-
tration of estates, desire to see the court travel. It sounded
the death knell of multiplicity of actions and proceedings
which in the English experience of administration of es-
tates by Chancery Courts led to the horrible results and
delays so aptly described by Dickens in Bleak House.
Contrast with such a situation the following words of
Chief Judge Cardozo:
'In re Malcomson, 188 App. Div. 600, 177 N. Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dept.1919).1 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928).
166 App. Div. 150, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dept. 1915), aff'd, 215
N. Y. 700, 109 N. E. 1079 (1915).
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"There remains a question of jurisdiction and
procedure. Liquidation may be ordered by a decree
of the surrogate as an incident to the allowance or
rejection of a claim to share as creditor in the assets
of the estate. Only by such relief can there be com-
plete justice between the parties without oppressive
expense or harrowing delay. A Surrogate's Court
has jurisdiction:
"'To administer justice in all matters relating
to the affairs of decedents, and upon the return of
any process to try and determine all questions, legal
or equitable, arising between any or all of the parties
to any proceeding, or between any party and any
other person having any claim or interest therein
who voluntarily appears in such proceeding, or is
brought in by supplemental citation, as to any and all
matters necessary to be determined in order to make
a full, equitable and complete disposition of the mat-
ter by such order or decree as justice requires.' Sur-
rogate's Court Act, Sec. 40.
"Early decisions were made upon the basis of a
different grant of power. They deny the competence
of a surrogate to decree the winding up of the busi-
ness of a partnership, though liquidation be a neces-
sary preliminary to the determination of a contro-
versy lawfully before him. Thomson v. Thomson, 1
Bradf. 24, 35; Matter of Irvin, 87 App. Div. 466,
470, 84 N. Y. Supp. 707. We must hold them super-
seded by the provisions of the statute. An amendment
in 1921 which emphasized the general grant of juris-
diction had at times been read as limited by specific
grants of jurisdiction as to enumerated subjects. Mat-
ter of Mondshain's Estate, 186 App. Div. 528, 174 N.
Y. Supp. 599; Matter of Hotzworth, 166 App. Div.
150, 151, N. Y. Supp. 1072; Id., 215 N. Y. 700,
109 N. E. 1079. The amendment gives notice that
the powers that are specific shall hereafter be
read as being 'in addition to and without limita-
tion or restriction on' the powers that are gen-
eral. Matter of Van Buren v. Estate of Decker,
204 App. Div. 138, 198 N. Y. Supp. 297; Matter
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of Haigh's Estate, 125 Misc. 365, 367, 368, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 521. Cf. Matter of Kenny, 92 Misc. 330, 156
N. Y. Supp. 827. 'Concentration of jurisdiction as
to decedents' estates' (per Foley, S., in Matter
of Haigh's Estate, swpra) is the purpose clearly
revealed in the statutory scheme. 'The state has
empowered siirrogates in unmistakable language,
and it is not the function of the courts to discover or
to fashion reasons for thwarting the manifest policy.'
Per Thomas, J., in Matter of Coombs, 185 App. Div.
312, 314, 173 N. Y. Supp. 58, 60. To remit the claim-
ant to another forum after all these advances and
retreats, these reconnaissances, and skirmishes, would
be a postponement of justice equivalent to a denial.
If anything is due him, he should get it in the forum
whose aid he has invoked." 25
And in passing upon the right of the divorced wife of a
dishonest trustee who was also the life tenant of a trust to
take a share of the income to which, had he been faithful
to his fiduciary duty, her late spouse would have been en-
titled, Mr. Surrogate Foley held, in the case of In re Boris'
Estate,26 that the court's equitable jurisdiction in account-
ing proceedings had been repeatedly sustained and was now
unquestioned. He held that the application of such recog-
nized equitable jurisdiction to the facts before him required
and authorized him to determine the question of priority
between adverse claimants to the same fund and reached the
equitable conclusion that the primary duty of the surrogate
was to compel its officer, who was the fiduciary of an estate,
to be faithful to his trust, and that, consequently, the claim
of the wife to receive part of the income which would have
been paid to her husband, had he been faithful to his trust,
was subordinate to the right of the estate to recoup its losses
out of said income, when they were caused by the dereliction
of the fiduciary.2 7
-248 N. Y. 67, 73. 161 N. E. 421 (1928).
- 143 Misc. 877, 257 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1932).
'In re Winslow's Estate, 151 Misc. 298, 272 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1934) ; In re
Burstein's Estate, 153 Misc. 515, 275 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1934); In re Haber's
Estate. 151 Misc. 82. 270 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1934) ; Matter of Lakner, 143 Misc.
117, 255 N. Y. Supp. 809 (1932).
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In discovery proceedings as they now exist under Section
205 et seq. of the Surrogate's Court Act, we find another
major advance in the matter of the equity jurisdiction of the
Surrogate's Court.
In one form or another, discovery for the benefit of the
representative of the estate has always existed in the Surro-
gate's Court since the enactment of Chapter 359 of the Laws
of 1870, but until the amendments made through the revi-
sions of 1921, the proceeding was of no substantial benefit to
the estate because the respondent was able to claim title and
thus divest the surrogate of any jurisdiction, either to order
the delivery of the property sought by the estate's representa-
tive, or to order the payment to such representative of the
proceeds of said property, if it had been sold or otherwise
wrongfully dissipated.
As late as 1918, it was said by the Appellate Division
in the Matter of Videgary,2 8 that a discovery proceeding
was not designed to try out questions of title between con-
flicting claimants.
That such was the law prior to the amendments to Sec-
tion 205, Surrogate's Court Act, made in 1924 and in 1933,
was definitely settled by the Matter of Hyams.2 9 In that
case the Court stated: 30
"Under the sections of the Surrogate's Court Act
to which reference has been made, it will be observed
that the proceeding is limited to an inquiry concern-
ing 'money or other personal property' which should
be delivered to the executor. At the conclusion of the
hearing the decree terminating the proceeding can
only direct the delivery of specific money or personal
property which belonged to the deceased in his life-
time. If such property has been exchanged for other
property, or sold, then the Surrogate's Court has no
power to direct that the same be turned over to the
executor. (Matter of Heinze, 224 N. Y. 1.) The Sur-
rogate's Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It
184 App. Div. 381, 170 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1st Dept. 1918).
237 N. Y. 211, 142 N. E. 589 (1923).
Id. at 216.
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has only such power as is conferred upon it by statute.
It has not been given power to determine the title, or
the right to possession, of any property, other than
that which belonged to the deceased in his lifetime.
"It is suggested that when sections 205 and 206
are read in connection with section 40, the Surro-
gate's Court has the power to determine all matters
necessary to be determined in order to make a full,
equitable and complete disposition of the matter in-
volved. Section 40 does not enlarge the powers of the
Surrogate's Court in so far as the same relate to a
discovery under sections 205 and 206. These sections
point out specifically what must be done to obtain the
discovery. An inquiry may be had concerning specific
personal property. The inquiry is in terms limited to
specific personal property, which was owned by the
decedent in his lifetime, and before a decree can be.
entered under section 206, it must appear that the
petitioner is entitled to the possession of the specific
property withheld. No decree can be entered direct-
ing the disposition of other property or proceeds de-
rived from property in case a sale has been made. The
right of an executor or administrator to compel dis-
covery of a decedent's property is not of recent origin.
It has existed for many years, as indicated by legisla-
tion and decisions upon the subject. It was not, how-
ever, until the amendment of 1914 (Chap. 443) that
title to property, the possession of which was sought,
could be tried. If a verified answer were interposed
denying the right to the possession of the property
specified, then until the amendment of 1914 the pro-
ceeding had to be.dismissed. (Matter of Walker, 136
N. Y. 20.) The remedy now given does not apply to
the case before us. Its primary purpose is still in-
quisitorial."
Such proceedings today have ceased to be purely in-
quisitorial and are now complete proceedings in which the
court exercises full equity jurisdiction, not alone to try the
title to assets claimed by an estate, but if it finds title in
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the decedent at the date of his death, it can, by its decree,
follow the property if it is in existence and order its return
to the fiduciary, and if it has been sold, it can order the
wrongdoer to repay the proceeds of the sale to the estate.31
This, however, does not make the Surrogate's Court a
collection agency and if the property sought in discovery is
merely a chose in action, such as a bank deposit, the Surro-
gate's Court still has no jurisdiction to compel the bank to
pay over the amount to the estate's representative.32
Surrogate Henderson of Bronx County has limited the
holding of the Court of Appeals in Raymond v. Davis' Es-
tate 33 to the equitable power to order a partnership liqui-
dation in an accounting proceeding, and has denied such
power in a discovery proceeding. This decision would seem
to be good law although if the partnership liquidation was
actually in progress in the Supreme Court it might now by
permission of that Court be transferred to the Surrogate's
Court under subdivision 9 of Section 40 of the Surrogate's
Court Act, which became effective September 1st, 1934. 3 4
This last mentioned subdivision of Section 40, Surro-
gate's Court Act, perhaps more than anything else indicates
the present tendency of the court to carry out literally the
apparent mandate given to it by the legislature to make a
full, equitable and complete disposition of any matter prop-
erly before it.
This new amendment gives the Surrogates' Courts of the
counties of New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx, Richmond and
Westchester, powers, which so far have not been granted to
any other Surrogates' Courts of the state, by enabling these
particular courts, as a matter of right, to transfer to them-
'Matter of Peno, 127 Misc. 718, 221 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1926) ; Matter of
Howley, 133 Misc. 34, 231 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1928); In re Dickman's Estate,
142 Misc. 307, 254 N. Y. Supp. 302 (1931) ; Matter of Fraley, 129 Misc. 803,
221 N. Y. Supp. 461 (1927) ; Matter of Gallagher, 137 Misc. 564, 241 N. Y.
Supp. 759 (1930) ; In re Forrest's Estate, 140 Misc. 14, 249 N. Y. Supp. 766(1931); In re Hammer's Estate, 140 Misc. 14, 249 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1931);
In re Hammer's Estate, 237 App. Div. 497, 261 N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dept.
1933), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 677, 185 N. E. 789 (1933) ; In re Dobkin's Estate, 145
Misc. 703, 260 N. Y. Supp. 909 (1932).
1 Matter of Brazil, 219 App. Div. 594. 220 N. Y. Supp. 331 (lst Dept.
1927); Matter of Arduini, 243 App. Div. 10, 276 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1st Dept.1934).1 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (192S).
IN. Y. Laws 1934, c. 352.
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selves for trial and determination, any action or proceeding
pending in a court other than the Supreme Court, in which
the representative of an estate is a party, if the trial and
determination of such action or proceeding is necessary to
the complete and final termination of a proceeding then pend-
ing undetermined in the Surrogate's Court. It further gives
the said Surrogates' Courts the power to receive similar
actions and proceedings pending in the Supreme Court,
which may, by the order of the Supreme Court, and the con-
sent of the surrogate, be transferred to the Surrogate's Court.
In all cases of transfer, whether from the Supreme Court
or from an inferior court, a proceeding must be pending in
the Surrogate's Court, the determination of which will be
expedited by the requested transfer.
No interference with existing rights of trial by jury or
other rights of the litigants involved, is suffered by them
through the transfer to the Surrogate's Court, because if
trial by jury has been seasonably demanded and the case is
on the jury calendar of the court where the action is pending,
such right of jury trial is preserved and the jury trial takes
place in the Surrogate's Court.
This statute has not been in force a sufficient length of
time for the bar and the public generally to appreciate its
full significance, but read in the light of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in Raymond v. Davis' Estate 35 it seems
to mean that in the counties mentioned, at least, a Surro-
gate's Court has full and complete jurisdiction of an equi-
table character. The constitution of the state of New York
expressly reserves to the Supreme Court all of the equitable
and chancery powers formerly possessed by the Chancellor
and exercised through the old courts of equity, so that it must
of necessity follow, that if an action is transferred from the
Supreme Court to the Surrogate's Court for trial, that in
such action at least, the Surrogate's Court has all of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
The completeness of the court's equitable jurisdiction
has been materially aided by the enactment of Section 231a,
Surrogate's Court Act,3" and particularly the paragraph
- 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928).
'N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 526.
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thereof added by Chapter 332 of the Laws of 1934, m giving
the court power to order an attorney to refund any sum
paid to him in excess of the fair value of his services, as
such fair value shall be determined by the surrogate; by the
addition of Section 231b, Surrogate's Court Act,38 giving
the surrogate power to fix, irrespective of any agreement to
the contrary, the reasonable value of the services rendered
by an attorney-in-fact, for a legatee or other person inter-
ested in an estate; and by the addition of Section 206a, Sur-
rogate's Court Act, 9 which is complementary to Section
205, and authorizes the surrogate to direct a representative
of an estate to pay over to a claimant, any property wrong-
fully withheld by such estate representative.
It is thus clearly the purpose of the legislature, as Mr.
Surrogate Foley stated in the Matter of Hfaigh's Estate,40
to concentrate jurisdiction of decedents estates in the Sur-
rogate's Court, and to give such court all of the necessary
power legal or equitable, to completely settle such estates.
Chief Judge Cardozo, citing with approval the Matter
of Haigh's Estate, adds:
"The amendment gives notice that the powers that are
specific shall hereafter be read as being 'in addition
to and without limitation or restriction on', the
powers that are general." 41
And in the same case quotes Mr. Surrogate Foley, in
the Matter of Haigh's Estate42 to the effect that:
"The state has empowered Surrogates in unmistak-
able language, and it is not the function of the courts
to discover or to fashion reasons for thwarting the
manifest policy."
'The amendment reads: "In the event that any such attorney has already
received or been paid a sum in excess of the fair value of his services as thus
determined, the surrogate shall have power to direct him to refund such excess."
' N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 206.
N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 539.
, 125 Misc. 365, 211 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1925).
'Raymond v. Davis' Estate, 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928).
" Supra note 40.
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This distinguished jurist, now a member of the highest
court in the land, lays down the rule, which it seems to us
should be the only rule applicable to these Surrogates'
Courts, when a question of their equitable jurisdiction is con-
cerned, for he says:
"To remit the claimant to another forum after all
these advances and retreats, these reconnaissances and
skirmishes, would be a postponement of justice equiv-
alent to a denial. If anything is due him, he should
get it in the forum whose aid he has invoked." 43
This salutary rule, if followed by the Surrogates and
the Appellate Courts, while it would of necessity further
increase the equitable jurisdiction of the Surrogates, would
avoid multiplicity of actions and proceedings and would
enable its judges, whose work in the last score of years has
been notable for its intelligence and expedition, to apply the
special knowledge which they have acquired so far as the
administration of problems coming before their court is con-
cerned, with a consequent gain to the public at large.
Decisions, such as the Matter of Vanderbilt, while mani-
festly right on the evidence submitted to the court, are unfor-
tunate in so far as they seek to deny or limit the equitable
jurisdiction of Surrogates' Courts. The problems coming
before such courts whether they be in accounting proceed-
ings, in proceedings affecting the rights of testamentary
trustees, or beneficiaries of testamentary trusts, legatees,
attorneys or claimants interested in decedent's estate, infants
or their guardians, adopted children and foster parents, can
best be handled in these Surrogates' Courts, which have today
developed highly specialized and efficient facilities for doing
complete justice.
In the Supreme Court, similar results can be accom-
plished only through expensive references and prolonged liti-
gation in a multiplicity of actions or proceedings.
The surrogate with the help of his clerks, experienced
through many years with the handling of the-special prob-
lems presented by infants' rights, whether personal or prop-
" Supra note 41, at 73.
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erty, the rights of those interested in the estates of decedents,
either as legatees, creditors or attorneys, or the rights or
obligations of fiduciaries, can, if given full equitable juris-
diction, render complete justice to all parties in a single
forum.
The grant of such general equitable jurisdiction would
in no way affect the jurisdiction and dignity of the Supreme
Court, which, as Mr. Justice Carew said, is the successor of
the King's High Court of Chancery, for experience has shown
that abuse of such power by the surrogates would scarcely
ever arise, and the amount of good to be accomplished would
far outweigh any occasional abuse which could easily be
corrected on appeal.
At the present time, it may be stated that there is no
general equity jurisdiction in the Surrogate's Court, such
equitable jurisdiction as it has being limited to the complete
determination of those special matters specifically committed
to it by statute.
CHARLES G. CosTE&
St. John's University,
New York City, 1936.
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